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Introduction1 
 
An option is often provided in insolvency legislation to disclaim property 
belonging to a debtor whose maintenance within the estate is deemed to 
constitute a liability. While by no means a generalised rule, enough 
jurisdictions have adopted this rule that it is recognised in the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide to Insolvency Law 2004 as forming one of the many 
recommendations for adoption by all insolvency regimes.2 A typical disclaimer 
provision normally allows an insolvency practitioner administering the estate 
to disclaim an on-going obligation in circumstances where requiring the debtor 
to remain bound by a contract would constitute an impediment to the efficient 
administration and conclusion of proceedings involving that debtor. Other 
property may be disclaimed where its maintenance may be unprofitable and 
result in further obligations or burdens being acquired, which ultimately are of 
little or no value to the estate. Justification for disclaimers sometimes refers to 
the harm to the general mass of creditors if maintenance of the property 
further diminished the pool available for distribution. As such, general 
creditors may not be said to have bargained for such burdens or obligations 
and fairness principles would require exclusion of the asset from the estate, 
reverting to the former owner or holder of a superior interest. Cases have, 
however, highlighted the particular problem of environmental obligations in 
relation to disclaimed property, especially if the disclaimer results in the public 
purse having to bear the cost.3 
 
In a number of jurisdictions, seeking the permission of the court is a 
necessary pre-condition to exercising the power. Notice to affected parties 
                                                 
1 Paul J. Omar would like to acknowledge the generosity of the University of New South 
Wales Australia in enabling the research behind this article through appointment as the 2013 
John Raneri fellow on the ATAX Fellowship Programme in August 2013. The authors further 
wish to thank the anonymous referees for casting a critical eye over the article and providing 
much useful criticism. Any errors or omissions are, however, the authors’ own. 
2  For a comparative view of selected jurisdictions and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
recommendations, see P. Omar, “Disclaiming Onerous Property in Insolvency: A Comparative 
Study” (2010) 19 International Insolvency Review 41. 
3 Re Mineral Resources Ltd (in liquidation), Environment Agency v Stout [1999] 2 BCLC 516; 
Official Receiver as liquidator of Celtic Extraction Ltd and Bluestone Chemicals Ltd v 
Environmental Agency [1999] EWCA Civ 1835; Environment Agency v Hillridge Ltd and 
others [2004] 2 BCLC 358 (United Kingdom). 
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may also be a requirement, permitting usually limited challenges to the 
proposed divestiture. There may also be a specified timeframe for the 
disclaimer to take effect and determining the extent of any unexpired 
obligation, thus binding parties as well as any third parties with claims derived 
from original title-holders. Nonetheless, affected parties do not remain wholly 
without remedy, as they may (usually) prove as unsecured creditors, albeit the 
chances of a distribution are slim. Alternatively, some jurisdictions authorise 
the same parties to apply for vesting of the property in them, especially if they 
have rights dependent on the debtor’s, for example sub-leases and like 
interests. Overall, the intention behind the disclaimer provisions is that to shed 
such property from the estate to allow for easier and faster administration of 
the insolvency. 
 
This article intends firstly to explore the history of the disclaimer option as it 
has been received into Australian legislation, giving some examples of past 
use. Then, in light of recent case-law, particularly the Willmott case discussed 
below, this article will question whether the courts have interpreted correctly 
the purpose and remit of the section in determining this case. The article will 
also go on to consider whether the trend for the contractualisation of 
“commercial” leases in the case is correct, given the judges’ reasoning, and 
whether there are any natural limits to the extension of the doctrine. The 
article will also canvass what limitations there may be on the use or impact of 
the disclaimer provisions, particularly any problems raised by their potential 
extension in circumstances not originally foreseen in the insolvency context. 
Lastly, the article will outline whether there is any case for reform of either the 
statutory provision or of the contractualisation trend. 
 
The Australian Disclaimer Provisions 
 
The transmission of English bankruptcy models, in particular the 1869, 1883 
and 1914 legislation, to various territories within the then British Empire (now 
Commonwealth) saw similar statutes being enacted elsewhere.4 This also led 
to a generalised acceptance of the place of the disclaimer provision that had 
first appeared in bankruptcy legislation in 1869,5  when it was adopted in 
England and Wales to replace the doctrine of election that bound a trustee to 
perform contracts or retain property within the estate subject to any burdens.6 
Once the disclaimer provision began appearing within companies’ legislation, 
they were transmitted along with the models extended or adopted elsewhere, 
especially those in the Companies Acts of 1929 and 1948.7 As part of this 
process, the disclaimer provision in Australia first appeared in State 
bankruptcy legislation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. When the 
Federal Government became responsible for regulation of personal 
                                                 
4 See V. Markham Lester, Victorian Insolvency (1995, Clarendon Press, Oxford), at 295-296, 
listing where extension or local adoption of English bankruptcy legislation occurred. 
5 See Enron Australia v TXU Electricity [2003] NSWSC 1169, at paragraphs 62-65 for a brief 
history of the provision following its adoption as section 23, Bankruptcy Act 1869. 
6 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) (Cmnd 8558) 
(“Cork Report”), at paragraph 1185. 
7 Examples of related provisions include Articles 171-173, Companies (Jersey) Law 1991; 
section 296, Companies Act 1965 (Cap. 125) (Malaysia); section 332, Companies Act 1967 
(Cap. 50) (Singapore). 
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insolvency, it was enacted as section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act 1924, closely 
modelled after the English provision. The reshaping in light of the work of the 
Clyne Committee between 1956 and 1962, leading to the passing of the 
Bankruptcy Act 1966, cast the provision in a form that would be very familiar 
today. 8  Changes resulting from the Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 1979 
extended the provision to enable the disclaimer of any contract, including 
those in relation to unsaleable, though not unprofitable, property. It also 
required notice to interested parties of the intention to disclaim any lease. 
Reviewing the shape of insolvency law in Australia, the Harmer Report made 
recommendations for the harmonisation of the disclaimer provisions across 
corporate and personal insolvency law. 9  Chapter 13 on “Insolvency 
Administration” of the Harmer Report made the point that, though infrequently 
used,10 the disclaimer is an important tool to avoid the possibility of the office-
holder’s personal liability for contracts.11 Having analysed the previous law 
and the differences between personal and corporate insolvency provisions, 
the Harmer Report’s recommendations centred on expanding the power to 
disclaim in corporate insolvency12 and recasting the definition of disclaimable 
property.13 It also suggested that there should be no difference between the 
disclaimer of a lease and other onerous property.14 Further recommendations 
included removing time limits on disclaimers15 and providing for notice of a 
disclaimer to affected parties, who would be able to challenge its effects.16 
Ultimately, the Harmer Report led to the introduction of what is now section 
568 of the Corporations Act 2001, a provision more or less in keeping with its 
recommendations. 
 
The present legislative framework for disclaimers, set out in Division 7A of the 
Corporations Act 2001,17 contains one of the most complex sets of provisions 
amongst common law countries. According to the law, a disclaimer may be 
made at any time in writing and signed on behalf of the company by a 
liquidator.18 Property is defined widely to include land burdened with onerous 
covenants, 19  shares, unsaleable or not readily saleable property, property 
                                                 
8  The Cork Report, at paragraph 1193, also referred to the Clyne Committee’s 
recommendations for a general power to disclaim that appeared in section 133, Bankruptcy 
Act 1966. 
9 ALRC Report 45 General Insolvency Inquiry (1988) (“Harmer Report”), at paragraphs 611-
622. 
10 See Cork Report, at paragraph 1191, making the same observation, attributing it to the 
provisions’ complexity and compliance costs, encouraging private resolution by the parties 
through surrender, assignment or abandonment. 
11 Harmer Report, at paragraph 611. 
12 Ibid., at paragraph 613. The power to disclaim would also be provided to an administrator 
(at the creditors’ behest), but not to a receiver (at paragraphs 621-622). 
13 Ibid. at paragraph 614. 
14 Ibid., at paragraph 620. 
15 Ibid., at paragraph 616. 
16 Ibid., at paragraph 618. Failure to challenge or a failed challenge would backdate the 
effectiveness of the disclaimer to the moment notice was given. 
17 See A. Keay and M. Murray, Insolvency: Personal and Corporate Law and Practice (4th ed) 
(2002, Lawbook Co, Sydney) at 340, noting that changes have aligned the corporate and 
personal insolvency rules. 
18 Section 568(1), Corporations Law 2001. 
19  Onerous covenants mean not just covenants in the traditional sense, but also other 
obligations that weigh on the land, for example mortgages and rates. See J. Duns, Insolvency 
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giving rise to a liability to an onerous obligation or a requirement to pay money, 
property whose realisation costs (including charges and expenses) would 
exceed, in all reasonable expectation, the proceeds of sale as well as any 
contract. 20  The facility to disclaim is available for all types of property 
(excepting contracts) irrespective of whether the liquidator has tried to sell the 
property, has taken possession of it or has exercised an act of ownership over 
the property. 21  As far as contracts are concerned, the facility remains 
available even though the liquidator may have exercised rights or attempted 
to assign the contract or any property it covers.22 
 
As an exception to the general rule that the liquidator is not required to seek 
the leave of the court, all disclaimers of contract, with two exceptions, relating 
to unprofitable contracts and leases of land, can only be made with leave 
being sought. 23  Leave will generally be granted by the court subject to 
conditions and the making of any orders the court considers just and 
equitable.24 Loss of the right to disclaim may occur where a person with a 
property interest makes an application in writing to the liquidator for the 
determination of a decision in relation to property or a contract.25 In this case, 
the liquidator has a period of 28 days (subject to possible extension) to 
disclaim, in default of which disclaimer is unavailable and, in the case of a 
contract, the liquidator is taken to have adopted it.26 In relation to contracts, 
the court also has the power, on application of an interested person, to either 
discharge the contracts on terms as to payment by one or other party of 
damages for non-performance to the other as the court thinks proper or the 
rescission of the contract followed by restitution of property. 27  Any sums 
payable by virtue of an order the court makes may be proved in the 
insolvency.28 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Law and Practice (2002, OUP, Sydney), at 238, citing Re Tulloch Ltd (in liq) and the 
Companies Act (1978) 3 ACLR 808; Re Middle Harbour Investments (in liq) (1975-76) CLC 
40-629. 
20 Section 568(1)(a)-(f), Corporations Law 2001. 
21 Ibid., section 568(1)(g). 
22 Ibid., section 568(1)(h). Section 568(1AA) disapplies this provision to share buy-backs and 
retention of title under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009. 
23 Ibid., section 568(1A). Keay and Murray, op. cit., at 339, point to the definition of what may 
be unprofitable contracts, citing Transmetro Corporation Ltd v Real Investments Pty Ltd 
(1999) 17 ACLC 1314 and Global Television Pty Ltd v Sportvision Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 35 
ACSR 484. Duns, op. cit., at 239, suggests that “unprofitable” could also include a substantial 
financial outlay necessary to continuing performance, citing Dekala Pty Ltd (in liq) v Perth 
Land and Leisure Ltd (1989) 17 NSWLR 664. Nonetheless, also citing Transmetro, Duns 
suggests that comparative financial advantage from a disclaimer, where the liquidator could 
continue to perform the contract without prejudicing his duty to realise assets for the benefit of 
creditors, would not be sufficient reason to authorise the disclaimer. 
24 Ibid., section 568(1B). 
25 Ibid., section 568(8)(a). Duns, op. cit., at 237, suggests that a property interest necessarily 
means a legal or equitable interest and would thus exclude a mortgagee of Torrens title land 
as well as the holder of a lien, citing the authority of Re Williams; Ex parte Perpetual Trustees, 
Executors and Agency Co of Tasmania (1931) 26 Tas LR 82 and Re Hensbergen and 
Aikman; Ex parte Cleland (1950) 15 ABC 238. 
26 Ibid., section 568(8)(b). 
27 Ibid., section 568(9). 
28 Ibid., section 568(10). 
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Notice requirements are a strong feature of this framework. As part of the 
disclaimer process, the liquidator may notify a person requiring the making of 
a statement of interest in relation to property for the purposes of determining 
whether the property is onerous. Compliance within 14 days is required.29 
Notice of the disclaimer itself is also required. Once property has been 
disclaimed, the liquidator must also give notice to interested parties and to the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, which may also be 
provided to any person having or claiming to have an interest in property.30 
Notice must also be given to a regulatory authority whose function is to note 
or register property transfers under federal and/or state laws.31 Where the 
liquidator has cause to suspect that some third party may have an interest, 
but they are not immediately locatable, the liquidator must advertise the 
proposal in a newspaper circulating in the state or territory where either the 
property is situated or the company has carried on business in the 6 months 
preceding the opening of proceedings.32 
 
The function of notice generally is to permit challenges by interested parties to 
disclaimers, which may take place either before or after the disclaimer takes 
effect. In the case of prior challenges, the law provides that an applicant 
claiming an interest must apply within 14 days of receipt of personal notice 
from the liquidator or, where publication in a newspaper has occurred, within 
14 days from publication. The same grace period also applies where the 
liquidator has lodged notice with one of the regulatory authorities. 33  On 
application, the court may set aside the disclaimer and/or make such further 
order as it thinks appropriate.34 The court must not, however, make an order 
unless it is satisfied that the claimant would suffer prejudice that is grossly 
disproportionate when compares to the prejudice that would result to the 
company’s creditors by setting aside the disclaimer.35 
 
In the case of post-event challenges, an applicant must apply for leave to set 
aside the disclaimer,36 which will only be granted if the court is satisfied it 
would not have been reasonable for the applicant to have taken steps prior to 
the disclaimer becoming effective.37 Again, in this situation, a court may set 
aside the disclaimer, but may also make a further appropriate order to restore 
the company, the liquidator or any other person in the position they would 
have been in had the disclaimer not taken effect. 38  However, there is a 
presumption against the making of such an order with the court having to be 
satisfied not only that the prejudice to the applicant is grossly disproportionate 
to that caused to the company’s creditors by reversing the effect of the 
                                                 
29 Ibid., section 568(13). 
30 Ibid., section 568A(1)(a)-(b). 
31 Ibid., section 568A(1)(d). 
32 Ibid., section 568A(1)(c), applying the publication requirements in section 568A(2). 
33 Ibid., section 568B(1). 
34 Ibid., section 568B(2). 
35 Ibid., section 568B(3). 
36 Ibid., section 568E(1). 
37 Ibid., section 568E(2)-(3). 
38 Ibid., section 568E(4). 
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disclaimer, but must also consider the interests of other parties who may have 
relied on the disclaimer taking effect.39 
 
Where a disclaimer is not challenged or no challenge is successful, a 
disclaimer is taken to terminate the company’s rights, interests and liabilities 
in the property concerned, but has no effect on any other person, except 
insofar as necessary to give effect to the release to the company.40 Any 
person who suffers a loss as a result of the disclaimer having effect may 
prove the debt.41 The date on which the disclaimer is deemed to take effect is 
when the application to set aside is unsuccessful or the period for challenge 
expires without an application. 42  In these cases, the date of effect is 
backdated to the day after the expiry of the notice periods the liquidator is 
required to comply with.43  Only where an application is successful is the 
disclaimer deemed not to have had any effect.44 Determining the effect of a 
disclaimer may be problematic. Duns cites the example of Re Tulloch,45 in 
which the sole asset was land subject to a mortgage in excess of its value, 
which the liquidator wished to disclaim after an unsuccessful receivership and 
attempt to sell the property. Regulatory authorities owed land tax and rates 
desired a compulsory sale in which their claims would trump the mortgagee’s 
or, as an alternative, that the land vest in the mortgagee, an order that was 
resisted. The mortgagee also resisted the disclaimer, the effect of which 
would have been to vest the property in the Crown with the claimants losing 
their rights. The court was not prepared to override the mortgagee’s 
objections to vesting and also considered the effect of the property vesting in 
the Crown, accordingly, refusing the disclaimer.46 
 
As an alternative to simple disclaimer, the court may make an order vesting 
the property in or delivering it to a third party, where that person is entitled to 
the property or where the court deems delivery appropriate to that person as 
well as any trustee for entitled or appropriate persons.47 The court may do so 
on the application of a person claiming an interest or subject to an obligation 
in respect of property and after hearing any person it deems appropriate.48 
The effect of the vesting order is generally to transfer property without any 
subsequent conveyance, transfer or assignment being required,49 although 
                                                 
39 Ibid., section 568E(5). A successful argument did arise in In the matter of Argyle Gravel & 
Concrete Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 374. 
40 Ibid., section 568D(1). Keay and Murray, op. cit., at 340, cite Sandtara Pty Ltd v Abigroup 
Ltd (1996) 19 ACSR 578, asserting that covenants in a disclaimed lease are not themselves 
determined and a guarantor will remain liable, albeit with a provable debt. 
41 Ibid., section 568D(2). Duns, op. cit., at 241, cite Re Richardsons Meat Industries Ltd 
(1989) 15 ACLR 343 as authority for the creditor whose lease contract was disclaimed to 
prove future rent less an amount for acceleration. 
42 Ibid., section 568C(1). 
43 Ibid., section 568C(3). 
44 Ibid., section 568C(2). 
45 Re Tulloch Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act (1978) 3 ACLR 808. 
46 Duns, op. cit., at 241-242. 
47 Section 568F(1), Corporations Act 2001. 
48 Ibid., section 568F(2). 
49 Ibid., section 568F(3). 
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state and Commonwealth statutes may still impose an obligation to effect 
registration, pending which the property transfer has only effect in equity.50 
 
The Willmott Saga 
 
The Willmott case arose from the failure of a company engaged in the agri-
business sector in 2010. A number of large plantation businesses of a similar 
type had also failed in the years preceding this, including Environinvest, 
Forestry Enterprises Australia, Great Southern and Timbercorp. What the 
companies sold, via managed investment schemes, was the opportunity to 
invest in the agricultural and/or forestry sectors and to realise over time profits 
from the sale of crops and forestry products. The market was focused in 
particular on softwoods, for which demand would undoubtedly be forthcoming, 
given high prices globally for agricultural products and commodities. 
Investment opportunities would tend to be opened and invitations made on a 
yearly basis for subscription to schemes, which would mature depending on 
the type of crop. In the case of the forestry sector, contracts would typically 
foresee a 25 to 30 year duration before the crop would mature sufficiently to 
enable harvesting. Other crops were more likely to involve short term maturity 
periods. Two factors in particular are said to have led to the collapses seen in 
the sector: general lessening of confidence in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis and a withdrawal of tax concessions in 2007 that had enabled 
investments to be offset against tax.51 
 
Other allegations emerged as a result of class actions filed by the investors 
against the companies involved and their directors. These included 
accusations that the prospectuses failed to disclose all the associated risks to 
investors and that the companies had overstated the value of assets within 
the schemes, in particular the land and the post-harvesting returns, while 
understating the liabilities, in particular the cost of future maintenance work on 
the plantations. Many of these investors had also borrowed moneys from 
lenders who had specifically set up schemes to finance these investments 
and, facing claims for the repayment of their borrowings, brought claims of 
breach of duty of care and unconscionable conduct against those lenders.52 
While the class actions against a number of the companies and lenders have 
experienced varying fates before the courts, concomitantly, the failure of a 
large number of businesses in a short time frame prompted a Corporations 
and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) report into managed investment 
schemes in July 2012, which recommended, inter alia, new governance 
mechanisms for such schemes and for financially stressed schemes to be 
assisted towards voluntary administration by new facilitative provisions, while 
a special liquidation procedure be instituted for insolvent schemes.53 
 
                                                 
50 Ibid., section 568F(4). 
51 See B. Butler, “Forestry Group faces Class Action” (Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 
2011). 
52 Idem. 
53 CAMAC Report on Managed Investment Schemes (July 2012), at paragraph 1.6.3. 
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In the context of the Willmott group insolvency, voluntary administrators had 
been appointed over companies belonging to the group in October 2010.54 
Concurrently, receivers were also appointed by the group’s lenders. When on 
discovering the companies in the group were insolvent, including Willmott 
(Forests) Limited, which was the scheme manager of a number of the 
schemes, the administrators were then appointed as liquidators in March 
2011. In May 2011, the liquidators applied to the Federal Court for directions 
to include comfort for the position they had reached on their justification for 
the disclaimer of leases so as to be able to sell the land unburdened by the 
leases and thus maximise returns for the creditors. They were held so justified 
on condition they sought consent of the court before making the disclaimers 
and amending the concomitant scheme documentation to permit disclaimers 
to take place. They then proceeded to draft contracts for the sale of the land 
comprised within the various schemes subject to court consent being obtained, 
these contracts being executed in December 2011. Shortly thereafter, an 
application was made to the Supreme Court of Victoria for consent, which 
application was heard before Justice Davies in late January 2012. 55  A 
preliminary question fell to be determined during the hearing, which was 
prompted by the intervention of lawyers on behalf of the Willmott Growers 
Group Inc, an action group representing the investors in the scheme. They 
had queried whether the purpose of section 568, as Parliament had enacted it, 
was to enable the disclaimer of leases by the liquidator that had the effect of 
extinguishing the property rights of the investors, many of whom considered 
themselves to be tenants under leases, albeit unregistered, language 
advocating this status having appeared or been suggested, they argued, in 
the scheme documentation. This depended, of course, on whether the 
investment contracts had in fact created leases with a proprietary effect, 
though it seemed both parties were prepared to admit that the agreements 
conveyed that effect in some, if not all cases. 
 
Willmott at First Instance: The Traditional View Prevails 
 
Before the court, counsel for the action group put the proposition, strongly 
resisted by the liquidators, to the effect that the type of leases contemplated 
by the law were those that were “property of the company”, as foreshadowed 
in the opening paragraph of section 568. This necessarily meant that the 
company could only disclaim leases which were its own property, meaning 
that where leases had been granted by the company as landlords to investors 
as tenants, the company had parted with its property and retained only a 
reversionary interest in the land, the only “property” it could then disclaim. 
Naturally, support for this position by the court would mean that the sale of the 
land could not take place in its then present form, since the disclaimer would 
not expunge the leases off the land. The only solution in such an instance 
would be for the company to find a buyer for the land as burdened or to 
disclaim its reversionary interest, in which case the land would escheat to the 
Crown and it would be then the State’s problem as to what to do with the 
underlying interests, given that arguably (on one view), as a species of 
                                                 
54 The facts here are derived from the summaries at the various stages of the Willmott case. 
55 Judgment was given on 9 February 2012 and reported as: Re Willmott Forests Limited 
[2012] VSC 29. 
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merger, escheat would preserve the tenants’ interests as depending on the 
freehold now vested in the Crown.56 Alternatively, the tenants could challenge 
the disclaimer and ask to be “accelerated” in their interests to become 
freeholders of the property. 
 
In the end, the court went with what was afterwards described as the 
“traditional position”57 to the effect that the disclaimer by the landlord of its 
contractual obligations did not of itself bring the proprietary effect of that 
contract to an end. For the court, where a tenant disclaimed, whether a tenant 
did so as lessee or contracting party made no difference, as the act of 
disclaimer terminated all the tenant’s “rights, interests, liabilities and property”. 
On the disclaimer happening, the landlord recovered the property as if the 
tenant had surrendered the lease.58 If a landlord effected a disclaimer of the 
lease, this could not operate so as to determine the leasehold interest, which 
was the tenant’s property, but only the landlord’s “rights, interests, liabilities 
and property”, however far those extended.59 This also brought into play a 
subsidiary issue in the case, which was where on the contract/property 
continuum leases lay. For the court, a lease was both an inter partes contract 
and the grant by the landlord of an estate in the land to the tenant with the 
tenant the owner of that estate.60 A disclaimer by the landlord could never 
have the effect of unilaterally extinguishing what amounted to someone else’s 
property rights. Support was found for this proposition in Re Bastable and 
Dekala.61 The contrary assertion in Re Jandowae,62 where the disclaimer by 
the landlord’s liquidator was held to have terminated the “correlative” rights of 
the tenant was distinguished on the basis that the judge in that case “did not 
illuminate” whether this also meant the property rights of the tenants.63 
 
Unsurprisingly, there are proponents and opponents of the judge’s decision. 
Professor Brown gives more weight to the Re Jandowae decision and is of the 
view that the contract and lease stand and fall together, while arguing that the 
Re Bastable and Dekala cases are merely support for the fact that the 
liquidator, as a trustee, will always take subject to any equities. 64  Some 
support for the “rolled-up” position can be found in the fact that originally the 
lease conferred no estate in land, but merely rights enforceable only against 
the lessee by way of damages. Through a combination of statutory and 
common law developments, the lease came to be treated as an interest in 
land protected against the entire world. The lease is then something of a 
                                                 
56 Submission to the CAMAC Enquiry by Counsel for the Growers Group (June 2011), at 
paragraph 37(b), citing NAB v NSW (2009) 260 ALR 115 as authority. Professor David Brown 
disagrees with this, stating that the disclaimer of the reversionary interest would simply cause 
the underlying interests to merge with it: “Disclaimer of Land: seeing the Wood through the 
Trees” (2012 April) Insolvency Law Bulletin 162, at 164. 
57  See A. Robertson, “Can’t see the Forest for the Lease” (28 May 2013) Lavan Legal 
Publications. 
58 Re Willmott Forests Limited [2012] VSC 29, at paragraph 10. 
59 Ibid., at paragraph 11. 
60 Ibid., at paragraph 9. 
61 Re Bastable [1901] 2 KB 518; Dekala Pty Ltd (in liq) v Perth Land and Leisure Ltd (1987) 
17 NSWLR 664. 
62 Re Jandowae Estates Pty Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 179. 
63 Re Willmott Forests Limited [2012] VSC 29, at paragraph 15. 
64 Brown, op. cit., at 163. 
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hybrid, involving both the conveyance of an estate in land and a set of 
contractual rights and obligation that continue to bind the parties throughout 
the relationship. Difficulties arise when it comes to deciding whether the 
parties’ relationship should be subject to normal contractual principles or 
should instead be governed by property principles. In fact, a trend in the past 
few decades in both Australia and the United Kingdom has been a move 
away from emphasising the proprietary nature of leases and treating them like 
other contracts, particularly those in the commercial sector. The courts have 
on occasion seen no reason why similar fact situations should be treated 
differently in standard contract (non-lease) and lease situations. 65 
Furthermore, they have also held that contractual principles can be extended 
to lease situations, including implied warranties (of habitability, fitness for use), 
frustration, mitigation of loss and repudiatory (anticipatory) breach.66 
 
Nevertheless, this view is not necessarily universal, as some courts have 
suggested that the view that landlord and tenant relationship is firmly based in 
contract has to sit alongside a more conventional analysis of lease 
arrangement as a conveyance of a proprietary estate.67 Similarly, the loose 
language of such agreements is not necessarily determinative. The terms 
‘lease’ and ‘tenancy’ refer to contractual aspects of relationship and not 
necessarily to the consequences (in proprietary terms) of that relationship.68 
However, the problem returns to that simple question of where leases sit as 
contract and/or as property. Hepburn makes the very valid point that “in some 
circumstances a right which begins as a contractual right may become a 
property interest”. 69  The struggle in determining what is contractual, and 
therefore subject to enforcement in personam, and what is proprietary in 
nature, upon which in rem rights may be founded, is an old struggle indeed 
going back to the dawn of English land law and witnessed by the way in which 
progressively mortgages, leases, restrictive covenants and occupation rights 
have come up against the contract/property boundary and, in some, but not all, 
cases been transmuted from purely contractual in nature to becoming 
“hybrids” with proprietary aspects.70 
 
The First Appeal: Contract Wins! 
 
In the Court of Appeal, to where the liquidators naturally took their disquiet at 
the judgment below, some comfort is given to the idea that the lease, 
especially the commercial variety of lease, is very much a creature of contract 
and property, but that its treatment can be “rolled-up” together, as the decision 
in Tabali clearly showed. As such, the disclaimer of the leases brought the 
                                                 
65 Hammersmith v Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478. 
66 Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 17. 
67 Hussein v Mehlman [1992] EGLR 87. 
68 Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [1999] 3 WLR 150. 
69 See S. Hepburn, Australian Property Law Cases Materials and Analysis (2nd ed) (2012, 
LexisNexis, Chatswood NSW), at paragraph 1.11. 
70 A good discussion of the process is to be found in A. Simpson, A History of the Land Law 
(1986, Clarendon, Oxford). National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 is an 
example of the House of Lords rejecting Lord Denning’s attempt at creating a “deserted 
wives’ equity” with proprietary effect. 
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tenants’ leasehold interests to an end.71 Looking at the context within which 
the scheme was created and run, the judges were of the view that the “lease”, 
such as it was, was only part of “a suite of inter-related documents” which 
regulated the scheme. It was difficult for the judges to regard the investors as 
having a leasehold interest or estate and their preference would be the view 
that there was “no demise of the kind that would survive any termination of the 
very contract that created the tenure”.72 Their view is that to suggest that 
commercial leases are a demise conferring an interest in land is to ignore the 
developments adverted to above which suggest a more contractually-based 
approach to such arrangements. 73  In this context also, the disclaimer 
provisions serve a particular purpose and their use determines the tenancy 
automatically, thus no acceptance of the repudiation is required as would be 
required normally.74 The tenants would have the right to claim damages and 
to prove in the insolvency for the quantum of their loss. 
 
The Second Appeal: Contract Wins Again! 
 
Given the interests and amounts at stake, it was not surprising that one or 
other side would be unhappy with the appeal judgment. So the matter came to 
the High Court by special leave to appeal, applied for in September 2012 and 
granted at a hearing on 10 May 2013. The matter was then argued on 9 
August 2013. At the hearing, the essential position of the parties was thus 
articulated: for the appellants,75 the only property the landlord had was the the 
reversion and if the landlord wished to disclaim this, it needed to bring the 
reversion under either paragraph (a): “land burdened by covenants” or 
paragraph (c): “not readily saleable property”. A reversion could not be a 
contract within the meaning of paragraph (f). As such, to equate the landlord’s 
interest, even if it went further than a reversion, with the concept of 
disclaimable contract in the last paragraph was not borne out by the language 
of the text. Cases such as Tabali which speak of the contractualisation of 
leases do not assist with this matter, which needs to be resolved by following 
the canons of statutory interpretation. In any event, leases are more than 
contracts, but pass property to a tenant. The arrangements under the scheme 
were equivalent to an executed demise, with all the landlord needing to do 
being to ensure quiet possession. As such, the tenants had acquired rights 
which could not be dispossessed by the landlord and which were equivalent 
to the types of interest seen in Re Bastable, although not registered. The 
effect of this is to prevent the extinguishing of a lease where the landlord only 
holds a reversion. Even if this view were incorrect, any disclaimer would only 
have the effect of determining the landlord’s interest. It could not amount to a 
repudiation or surrender that affected the tenant’s property. As in Re Bastable 
and Dekala, if equities could survive, so too would a lease. 
 
                                                 
71 Re Willmott Forests Ltd [2012] VSCA 202 (29 August 2012), at paragraphs 39-43. 
72 Ibid., at paragraph 51. 
73 Ibid., at paragraph 52. 
74 Ibid., at paragraph 47. 
75 This section is a summary of the Appellant’s Submissions (filed 14 June 2013) and Reply to 
the Respondents (filed 19 July 2013). 
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For the respondent liquidators,76 the disclaimable property included both the 
reversion, which they accepted would fall under paragraph (a), but also the 
lease, which is created by contract and would fall therefore within the scope of 
paragraph (f). Subject to the limitation on court involvement, the inclusion of 
leases within the category of contracts in that paragraph necessarily means 
that leases must be regarded, just as contracts, in toto. As such, disclaimer 
terminates both the contractual and proprietary effects of the lease, as the 
statute effectively contemplates by referring simply to a “lease”. The cases on 
contractualisation support this, particularly Tabali. Where disclaimer occurs 
and the landlord purports to terminates its “rights, interests, liabilities and 
property”, of necessity the leasehold interest must fall away, because the 
tenant is similarly released from its “rights, interests, liabilities and property”. 
This is particularly true because the lease cannot survive repudiation of the 
landlord’s liabilities to guarantee the tenant quiet enjoyment and not to 
derogate from the grant, which are necessary to give efficacy to the leasehold. 
 
The judgment, which came on 4 December 2013, was keenly anticipated.77 
By a 4:1 majority,78 the appeal was dismissed in language similar to the 
language of the appeal court below. The High Court interpreted the leases as 
contracts that fell within section 568(1)(f). This freed the liquidators to sell the 
reversion unencumbered. As such, the “tenants’ rights to quiet enjoyment and, 
non-derogation” were terminated and “the tenants are … left with the right to 
prove in the winding up as creditors.”79 Interestingly, in his well-articulated 
dissent, Justice Keane would have rejected the liquidators’ right to disclaim, 
ruling firstly that, as the liquidators had not sought the leave of the court 
pursuant to section 568(1A), the disclaimers were ineffective, and that “if the 
Liquidators were to disclaim Willmott's contracts to lease the parcels of land in 
question with the leave of the court, that disclaimer would free Willmott from 
further observance of its obligations under the leases, but it would not be 
effective to deprive the Growers of their right to possession for the balance of 
the term, to the extent that a court of equity would restrain an attempt to 
deprive the Growers of their right to possession.”80 He noted, inter alia, that 
“the scope of the power to disclaim… [is] limited by its focus upon the rights of 
the insolvent company.” 81  He alone addressed policy considerations; 
observing that “[s]ince the introduction of the statutory power of disclaimer in 
1869, neither judicial exegesis nor academic commentary has attributed to the 
power of disclaimer the potential to enhance the value of the estate of the 
company in liquidation, much less to alter the position of those who have dealt 
with the insolvent by divesting them of rights vested in them.”82  He also 
referred to the Harmer Report in support of his conclusion that “as a matter of 
ordinary language, to speak of ‘disclaiming a lease’ is to speak of disclaiming 
                                                 
76 This section is a summary of the Respondents’ Submissions (filed 5 July 2013). 
77  Reported as: Willmott Growers Group Inc v Willmott Forests Limited (Receivers and 
Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) [2013] HCA 51. 
78 French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Gageler JJ formed the majority, with Keane J in dissent.  
79  Willmott Growers Group Inc v Willmott Forests Limited (Receivers and Managers 
Appointed) (In Liquidation) [2013] HCA 51, at paragraph 55. 
80 Ibid., at paragraph 161. 
81 Ibid., at paragraph 115. 
82 Ibid., at paragraph 125. 
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a contract which is the property of the lessee.”83 This would relieve a lessee of 
an ongoing burden but would leave the landlord free to negotiate with a 
replacement tenant, including an existing sub-tenant. This approach would 
provide minimal disruption to commercial arrangements upstream and 
downstream that the insolvent party had with solvent counterparties.84 
 
Disclaimers as an Insolvency Issue: Did Willmott get it Right? 
 
Since the judgement appeared, it has been the subject of a certain amount of 
commentary, chiefly in the professional and “cross-over” publications, where 
both academics and practitioners write.85 It does not appear, however, that 
the judgement has met with favour. One Australian perspective characterises 
the judgement as causing “disquiet” because it “ostensibly undermines 
tenants’ security of tenure.” While consonant with the “longstanding purpose 
of the disclaimer provisions”, the extension of the facility in Willmott appears 
to undermine the financing of and taking of security over commercial 
property. 86  Citing other professional views, the author notes the usual 
commercial practice of using disclaimer as a trigger for default with a 
consequent impact on security enjoyed by the lender, often extinguishing it. 
Security practices will, as a result of the case, change to require greater 
consideration of the profile of the borrower and increased due diligence, while 
further reporting and disclosure obligations may well be imposed. Personal 
guarantees and options to purchase the property may well be used to 
supplement the security arrangement, while events of default may well be re-
characterised to include breaches of covenants or insolvency happening to 
the borrower’s superior in title. All of these will impose greater “costs, 
inconvenience and risk.” Notwithstanding this, a by-product of the case may 
well be that liquidators resort more often to the use of such a power to swell 
the assets available to general creditors. However, and perhaps more 
importantly, the case leaves unanswered the questions of whether leave is 
still required for lease disclaimers and what considerations courts will apply in 
the event of applications being made.87 What might occur in scenarios where 
disclaimers are a realistic possibility is that affected parties may well become 
pro-active and require liquidators to determine whether to disclaim and may 
also challenge such disclaimers more readily.88 
 
Commentators in the United Kingdom have been more robust in their 
criticisms. Cranston and Calland believe that an English court would have 
decided matters differently. 89  Anderson states in no uncertain terms that 
                                                 
83 Ibid., at paragraph 129. 
84 This policy is reflected in Ontario in section 39(2), Commercial Tenancies Act 1990. 
85  Examples include P. Cranston, “The Impudence of Liquidators” (2014) 7(1) Corporate 
Rescue and Insolvency 3; T. Calland, “Willmott Growers from an English Perspective” [2014] 
29(3) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 160; H. Anderson, 
“The Law of Disclaimer: Would Willmott be followed in England?” (2014) 11(5) International 
Corporate Rescue 316. 
86 See O. McCoy, “Willmott Forests – Disclaimer by Liquidators of an Insolvent Landlord” 
(2014) 26(1) Australian Insolvency Journal 14. 
87 Ibid., at 16. 
88 Ibid., at 17. 
89 Cranston, op. cit. at 8; Calland, op. cit., at 164. 
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Willmott is: “from an English law perspective… wrong in principle.” Apart from 
the differences between the two countries’ legislation, which he argues are 
material, insolvency law in England would not “regard a leasehold estate as 
merely a species of contract”, nor would it “permit the adventitious 
disaggregation of interests for the purposes of disclaimer.” Reasons for this 
position include the view that disclaimer could not deprive tenants of vested 
proprietary rights, a situation that might lead to injustice, in the absence of any 
statutory protection for such tenants.90 A further perspective from practice 
states categorically that the judgement: 
 
“…impermissibly erodes the concept of security of tenure insofar as it allows a 
liquidator unilaterally to determine accrued property rights. Effectively leases are then 
treated as nothing more than contracts. As a matter of commercial analysis, it seems 
that the property rights in this case were merely incidents of a pure investment 
scheme, but nevertheless as a matter of law the tenants had acquired property rights 
which were then stripped away in the insolvency, leaving them with mere money 
claims.”91 
 
This view is echoed in an Australian journal, where the authors suggest, on a 
proper reading of the Harmer Report, that the disclaimer provision was never 
intended to permit the “compulsory forfeiture of proprietary interests.” 92 
Concerns reflected here are not just about the impact in practice on lending 
and corollary asset-security arrangements, but raise vital issues about the 
true nature of the arrangement being entered into. Is it simply about contract 
or property or both? 
 
The Contract/Property Dichotomy: Willmott’s Part in the Debate 
 
The Willmott debate has brought to the fore the contractualisation debate and 
the proper place of leases, in particular commercial leases, on the boundaries 
of contract and property law. A number of issues are raised by this. The dual 
character of a lease has given rise to conceptual difficulties, as underscored 
by the divergent judicial approaches adopted in the Willmott litigation thus far. 
It pays to recall that the judge at first instance in Willmott respected the 
proprietary interest of the lessee, notwithstanding the operation of the 
statutory disclaimer. In contrast, the Court of Appeal and the High Court in 
Willmott endorsed the transmutation of the lease, from its dual character, to 
one of contractual status. The latter approach, undoubtedly, offers a seductive 
simplicity in that if the contract goes, the rest goes including the leasehold 
interest. In such circumstances, the statutory disclaimer facilitates the purpose 
of a prompt winding up, albeit in a ham fisted way. Some may say such an 
outcome is perfectly defensible in the context of insolvency. Others may 
object to the contractualisation of leases in this manner, pointing to the fact 
that in practice a variety of leases exist and that its use will depend on a 
multitude of different situations – it can range from the tax driven scheme 
such as in Willmott, to commercial leases in shopping centres or residential 
                                                 
90 Anderson, op. cit. at 316. 
91 XXIV Old Buildings, Insolvency Bulletin (May 2014). 
92  L. Powers, G. Breen and J. Melluish, Insolvency Law and Management: Disclaimed 
Leases: Is there any Hope for Tenants? (2014) 25 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and 
Practice 48, at 51. 
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leases.93 Given that the context and purposes of leases lacks uniformity, it 
begs the question as to whether a more nuanced approach is required 
towards the statutory disclaimer of leases. The danger with the High Court’s 
approach is that it seems to sanction the use of the statutory disclaimer 
provisions of leases as a blunt tool. It may be questioned whether Parliament 
intended to interfere with vested rights – the rights accrued to the lessee, such 
as possession and quiet enjoyment. In this regard, the consequences of 
Willmott are to render the process by which property interests are given effect 
more uncertain. 
 
Willmott may also be seen as a stage in the debate about the proper 
boundaries between contract and property. English law, it is said, has always 
had a numerus clausus approach to the recognition of estates and interests. 
In this “catalogue”, the construction of proprietary relationships can only be 
done through the use of the “conventional building blocks” the law provides.94 
When one examines the list the Grays provide, 95  however, “mortgages”, 
“terms of years absolute” (leases) and “restrictive covenants” leap out as 
being originally contractually founded interests that now have recognised 
proprietary effect, although this was not always the case.96 A case may also 
be made for “easements” and “profits à prendre”, often created through 
contract, although the law, widely held to derive from the Roman law of 
servitudes, tends to classify these as real interests once created. The authors 
do acknowledge, nonetheless, that the categorisation of what constitutes a 
proprietary entitlement may be “loosen[ing] up”, thus possibly foreseeing the 
extension other categories of interest. In that light, they also postulate that the 
frequent bids being made by contractual licences for inclusion within the 
catalogue “must surely one day succeed”, 97  suggesting that the numerus 
might actually be apertus, rather than clausus. However, evident within this 
debate is that the transition appears to be one-way, from contractual to 
proprietary. None of the interests appear to have retrogressed. 
 
What Willmott appears to suggest, however, is that some interests will be 
downgraded if they are deemed to require primacy to be given to the 
contractual aspect of the relationship. This is not a novelty, given the 
contractualisation debate referred to earlier and also the tendency to give 
effect to contractual arrangements if this reflects the commercial nature of the 
bargain.98 However, one cannot help but reflect that, as Hepburn articulates it: 
 
                                                 
93 An example given by a number of the attendees at the talk was the retirement village 
scheme, the question being what might happen to the unit purchasers in the event of the 
management company’s insolvency. 
94  See K. Gray and S. Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th ed) (2009, OUP, Oxford), at 
paragraph 1.712.  
95 Ibid., at paragraph 1.7.15. 
96 Simpson, op. cit. (in extenso). 
97 Gray and Gray, op. cit., at paragraph 1.7.14. 
98 Malayan Credit Ltd v Jack Chia-MPH Ltd [1986] AC 549, a case in which business tenants 
taking a joint tenancy of premises at law were presumed to intend holding as tenants in 
common in equity, thus reflecting what was viewed as being the typical “commercial” bargain. 
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“the existence of a contract does not mean that the relationship can never be 
regarded as proprietary. It is possible for the relationship to confer both contractual 
and proprietary rights.”99 
 
This statement can also be understood insofar as such relationships confer 
both types of rights, something more than simply a “commercial” 
characterisation is required to divest the relationship of its proprietary 
character. In that light, the High Court’s determination is possibly erroneous, 
but can also be seen as reflecting the “duality” of such arrangements and the 
desire to give more weight to the contractual aspect of the bargain.100 
 
The Law of Unintended Consequences: A Wider Possible Application of 
Willmott 
 
The tension between liquidators and tenants in the disclaimer context is not 
just of concern in the managed investment scheme sector, but has application 
elsewhere in other fields involving contractual relationships dealing with 
property interests. Business format franchising is a complex, contract-based 
environment that has gained increasing acceptance since the mid-1990s. In 
the case of business format franchising, for instance, a franchisor will 
commonly enter into a head lease of premises and then grant a franchisee the 
right to establish its business in the premises. The franchisee’s tenure is 
established by way of a sub-lease or licence. The franchise will be granted in 
a separate contract, the franchise agreement of potentially long duration. The 
franchise agreement includes a right for the franchisor to terminate it if the 
franchisee enters insolvent administration but this right is rarely reciprocal. 
Executing a franchise agreement triggers the investment by franchisees of 
considerable sunk sums in fitting out their shop, restaurant or hotel premises. 
Establishment of their business involves franchisees in many additional 
contracts (with suppliers, employees, financiers) that are not expressed to be 
contingent on the franchisor’s continuing solvency. It is not uncommon for 
franchisors to become insolvent, but for the franchisees’ businesses to be 
solvent, and viable if freed of the franchise agreement. The franchisor’s 
liquidator may disclaim the franchise agreement when it is concluded that the 
franchisor’s business cannot be sold as a going concern, but in a situation 
analogous to Willmott, the franchisees’ businesses and their investment in 
physical premises provide them with rights that may be recognised as rights in 
rem. Once the franchise agreements are disclaimed a burden on the 
franchisor’s insolvency estate is removed. The remaining burden is the head 
lease. This may have already been breached by the franchisor failing to pass 
on to the landlord moneys paid by franchisees for rent and outgoings. 
Franchisees are not creditors of the franchisor in respect of the upfront part of 
their investment, the costs sunk in fitting out their premises. If disclaimer of 
the head lease removes not only the franchisor’s ongoing contractual liability 
(the burden) but the franchisee’s interest in the premises entirely, leaving the 
landlord with empty premises instead of a viable tenant, and the franchisee 
                                                 
99 Hepburn, op. cit., at paragraph 1.14. 
100 See P. Butt, “Dual Character of Lease confirmed in Fiscal Context” (2015) 89 Australian 
Law Journal 147, at 148; P. Babie, “The Durability of Title: An Appraisal of Recent 
Developments in Australian Real Property Law” (2014) 4 Property Law Review 22, at 29. 
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potentially with its own insolvency, it is hard to see this as a sound or intended 
outcome of the disclaimer process. 
 
A further unintended consequence is that the insolvent estate is enriched by 
the liquidator’s ability to disclaim the onerous contract and then to re-sell the 
interest of the non-breaching party and to apply the proceeds of sale for the 
benefit of the insolvent party’s creditors. In Willmott this meant the liquidator 
was now free to sell the land formerly encumbered with the management 
agreements. The purchaser obtained the benefit of the trees which it could 
mill and sell. In the case of a business format franchise the franchisor’s 
liquidator can re-sell the franchise opportunity without having to compensate 
the original franchisee directly. In theory the investors in the forestry scheme, 
and the disenfranchised franchisees could claim as unsecured creditors but in 
practice this would yield them a far smaller sum in compensation than the 
liquidator obtained in the sale of the disclaimed property. An action for unjust 
enrichment could be pursued by franchisees in this situation. A franchised 
business is, by its nature, highly geographically dispersed and consequently it 
is unlikely the franchisees could move quickly enough. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In light of the judgment of the High Court, some questions remain. Firstly, is 
this simply an issue of definition? The Court of Appeal stated that these 
complex commercial arrangements might not have any proprietary effect at all 
and could not be regarded properly as estates in land. If they in fact do not, as 
the High Court also determined, then perhaps the question is conclusively 
resolved. As contracts, they can simply be disclaimed,101 leaving the investors 
to elect to challenge the disclaimer or to prove what losses they may have 
incurred as unsecured creditors in the insolvency. If, however, they remain 
estates (as the limited commentary thus far seems united in saying), albeit 
unregistered, and thus taking effect only in equity, then three questions are 
raised. The first is: what property is thereby left to the landlord to disclaim? If 
the landlord has truly parted with the leasehold estate and it is the tenant’s 
property, does this mean the only thing left to the landlord to disclaim is the 
reversion? On one view (the investors) this is the case, on the other (the 
liquidators) it is not. The second question would be, even if the reversion were 
the only such property, could the lease in any event be disclaimed by treating 
it as a contract under paragraph (f)? For the investors, the word lease here 
could only include a lease that was the company’s property. For the 
liquidators, the word lease was not qualified in the statute and could mean 
any lease to which the debtor was a party, akin to what would happen in 
contract. This brings to the fore a third question: always assuming that the 
landlord could disclaim a lease, what would be the effect of the disclaimer? 
For the growers, despite the cases that speak of the contractualisation of 
                                                 
101 With or without court involvement, depending on whether they are “unprofitable”. In the 
United Kingdom, unprofitability also needs to be evidenced and requires proof of more than 
just a bad bargain: Re SSSL Realisations (2002) Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 7, at paragraph 36, 
adopting the five principles with respect to determining this outlined by Justice Chesterman in 
Transmetro Corporation Ltd v. Real Investments Pty Ltd (1999) 17 ACLC 1,314, at paragraph 
21. 
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leases, simply disclaiming the lease only brought its contractual aspects to an 
end and did not disturb its proprietary aspects: the grant of the estate that had 
occurred by means of the same contract. For the liquidators, both stood or fell 
together. This was necessarily so because of the trend for contractualising 
leases that is amply supported in the jurisprudence, particularly in relation to 
arrangements with commercial overtones. 
 
There are a number of difficulties that are not clearly dealt with in the High 
Court judgement. Firstly, does the contractualisation of leases evident in the 
case-law necessarily lead to the position that a disclaimer of a contract brings 
to an end any and all proprietary effects of that contract? In fact, had the 
leases been registered, the indefeasibility provisions of the property statutes 
would not permit the transactions to be so casually unwound.102 Where the 
leases were not registered, would this merit any different a treatment? If, as 
the court suggests, the questions are to be answered in the affirmative and 
the disclaimer has that effect, there is an obvious risk. Such a treatment would 
expose grantees of leases to the risks of their grantor’s insolvency. Does this 
affect all types of grantees? In particular, would this mean that residential 
tenants bore the same risks in the event of their landlord’s insolvency as 
commercial tenants or investors under managed investment schemes? 
Second, should the possibility of disclaimer be confined to commercial leases 
or should it extend to all leases? Whereas many commercial leases are 
genuinely negotiated, many others are standard form contracts. Franchise 
agreements, too, are standard form contracts where, as noted earlier, it is rare 
for a franchisee to be able to successfully negotiate inclusion of an ipso facto 
clause that permits the franchisee to terminate its franchise agreement on the 
insolvency of the franchisor. 
 
Third, beyond the case of Argyle Gravel, 103  which concerned a 
superannuation fund, there is no evidence that aggrieved counterparties in 
Australia have in fact used the challenge to a disclaimer provision available 
under section 568E(5) of the Corporations Act 2001 on the basis that the 
disclaimer “has caused, or would cause… prejudice that is grossly out of 
proportion to the prejudice that setting aside the disclaimer… would cause to 
the company’s creditors.” In situations like Willmott, and in business format 
franchising, the directors and their funding sources are often aware of the 
financial challenges facing the future insolvent party long before the investors 
or franchisees become aware that their investment is threatened by 
insolvency.104 Is it, then, equitable for those “in the know” to benefit from a 
greater level of security than investors or franchisees? By backing investment 
opportunities known to be failing, and by encouraging franchisees and other 
                                                 
102 The authors are indebted to Alex Welch of Henry Davis York for this observation. In 
practice, where the landlord is the owner of, for example, a large shopping complex, the 
landlord tends to discourage tenants from entering registrable leases on the title as it makes it 
cumbersome for registered proprietors to conduct their business. 
103 See above note 39. 
104 See, for example, A. Ferguson and R. Williams, “Victims seek olive branch from ANZ over 
Timbercorp collapse” (Sydney Morning Herald, 8 November 2014). See also J. Buchan, 
“Franchising: A Honey Pot in Bear Trap” (2014) 34(2) Adelaide Law Review 283, at 312, 
identifying 3 franchisors knowingly trading while insolvent for up to 18 months before the 
administrator’s appointment. 
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investors to borrow money to buy these opportunities, these parties risk 
prosecution by investors or regulators for mis-selling products and for financial 
malpractice. 
 
The prospects of a wholesale disruption of the leasehold sector with the 
introduction of both unintended consequences and these added risks, new 
and unanticipated for many, might lead to a loss of certainty and predictability 
in the leasing sector and result in financial institutions reassessing, perhaps 
unfavourably, the risks of lending. In this case, the most obvious next question 
is whether, to palliate these problems, a distinction could be made between 
commercial and non-commercial situations with contracts being “rolled-up” in 
the former, while tenants in the latter category might benefit from some 
different treatment, whatever that might be? The difficulty here, of course, is 
that once a definition is attempted, there will undoubtedly be difficult examples 
that do not fit neatly in one or other category.105 In the last analysis, the 
Willmott case has thrown up the ambiguity of the wording of the statute. Is this 
not an ideal time, therefore, to amend the text to ensure greater clarity and to 
make proper regulation, should this be desirable, for certain categories of 
property?106 
 
31 August 2015 (revised 20 April 2016) 
                                                 
105  Another contentious example is the retirement village scheme commonly found in 
Australia, the question being what might happen to the unit purchasers in the event of the 
management company’s insolvency. 
106 McCoy, op. cit., at 14, refers to the editorial comment in A. Lang et al., Lang’s Commercial 
Leasing in Australia (2013, CCH, Sydney), at paragraph 85-403, which states: “it falls to the 
legislature to amend the disclaimer provisions in the Corporations Act 2001… if it wants to 
restore the traditional meaning of disclaimer.” 
